Lessons for the Month of Rabiul Awwal

By Abdul Malik Mujahid

The two men left the city, young hooligans at their heels. The hooligans, spitefully and without mercy, hurled rocks at the two noble travelers, furiously chasing them as the two dignified men left the city.

By the time the Prophet Muhammad (s) and his adopted son Zaid bin Harithah (ra) had made it out of Taif, the Prophet (s) was bleeding and in pain. Zaid (ra), noticed that there was so much blood in the Prophet’s (s) shoes that his feet were stuck. His visit to the city had garnered no new support for his cause. In fact, the Taifites had treated him with utter disrespect and disgust. Rejection is always painful. But this rejection came at a time of especial difficulty, when his beloved wife Khadija (ra) and the protection and support of his uncle Abu Talib had been taken away by their respective deaths. Any normal person would have felt hopeless, dejected and demoralized.

But at this time, when he was physically almost alone and without visible protecction and support of those two important people, he offered a prayer to God that is itself a mighty inspiration to those of us currently in difficulty.

Here is a translation of his prayer:

“To You, My Lord, I complain of my weakness, lack of support and the humiliation I am made to receive.

Most Compassionate and Merciful! You are the Lord of the weak, and You are my Lord. To whom do You leave me? To a distant person who receives me with hostility? Or to an enemy to whom You have given power over me?

If You are not displeased with me, I do not care what I face. I would, however, be much happier with Your mercy.

I seek refuge in the light of Your face by which all darkness is dispelled, and both this life and the life to come are put on their right courses against incurring Your wrath or being the subject of Your anger. To You I submit, until I earn Your pleasure. Everything is powerless without Your support.”

In this prayer we can see Prophet (s) had hope for the future. He did not, as some do, lash out at God, even in this seemingly desperate situation. Nor did he feel that the way things had turned out at Taif would remain this way or that his cause was no longer worth pursuing.

The Prophet (s) remained optimistic.

Then God sent angels who offered to destroy the people of Taif for the way they had treated him.

His response was this: “No, I hope that God will bring out from their offspring people who worship Him alone and associate no partners with Him.”

It was a man born to these abusers of Taif who, within 80 years, brought Islam to South Asia–which is now home to almost one-third of all Muslims in the world. The 17-year-old Muhammad bin Qasim was the son of the Thaqafi tribe of Taif, the same city where the Prophet (s) could not find a single believer, but was hopeful that if not they, then their children would find their way to God.

Muhammad bin Qasim was sent to Sind to rescue a few Muslim women detained by a local pirate chief who refused to let them go via diplomatic channels. The chief was Hindu while the population of that area was mostly Buddhist. It was the character of Muhammad bin Qasim which helped open the doors of Islam to the population. I happen to be one of the Muslims whose forefathers were impressed by these children of the Taifite abusers.

May Allah’s peace and mercy be on the Prophet (s) who was forgiving to those who abused and tortured him–the Prophet (s) who remained hopeful while he had less than 100 people who believed in him and in the One God. May his message of mercy touch the hearts of believers and give hope to those who are under stress.

May we all learn from this great lesson and adopt the two Prophetic traits of hope and optimism in our lives as we witness the miserable situation of Muslims the world over. Let us remember that if we look only at what is today, we don’t consider what could be in the future with the Will and Help of Allah.

9-15

By Beena Inam Shamsi, Muslim Media News Service (MMNS)

Sana Ali never had a Muslim friend up until she started college. Her early years of life were spent in Jacksonville, Florida, her peers mostly white people. This lack of association with the Muslim community did not hinder her iman in the least bit but in turn made her more tolerant of other religions and peoples of other colors.
Since a very young age, she hoped to become an essential part of the Muslim community; she knew in her heart that she had an ability to lead.

“I was always the brown girl, different girl,” Ali said. “I went from having very little contact with Muslim friends and the Muslim community to now, where I am at the core to be involved.”

Ali, 20, of Detroit, has worked her way to achieve her dream of becoming a president of the Muslim Student Organization of Wayne State University. She sacrificed her time and some of her classes to make room for the MSA’s board.

She is a junior at Wayne State, majoring in Biology/Pre-Optometry. Ali said she took more classes at the beginning of the semester and had to drop a few to accommodate MSA. She said that she loves representing the MSA, and added that she is still looking to find a balance between her studies and the MSA’s work.
Her task as president ranges from making decisions for the MSA to arranging guest lectures and dinners. Ali had been working very hard to meet the demands on her personality and time from the demands of being on MSA’s board.

People who know her admire her allegiance and her great enthusiasm for the MSA’s work.
Grant Joseph Shafer, a pre-medicine student at Wayne State, who has known Ali only for a few months, has come to appreciate the strength of her character and conviction that she brings to her life and the MSA.
“Ali approaches each day with a passion that is very rare in this age of apathy,” Shafer said.
He further said that Ali is unafraid to speak her mind and strives to show people of all races and religions the respect and compassion that they deserve as human beings, which makes her a truly remarkable individual.
Ali is not only the President of the MSA; she is also working in a Student Council Budget Committee. In addition, she holds a job at the calling center on Wayne State, where she asks alumni for donations for the school, and most of this money goes for scholarship to the students.

Ali is also a chair of MSA Central Zone Transportation, which is a part of MSA National. MSA National organizes dynamic regional, zonal and continental conferences that focus on students. As a C-Zone Transportation Chair, her responsibilities include organizing transportation for students who attend the conference out of town.
Those who stay in the hotel need transportation to and from the hotels to the conference site. She organizes the pick-up and drop-off of students from airports and busses and makes sure everything runs in a timely manner and efficiently, said Ali.

Ali said she does not make the ultimate decisions for MSA until the entire board comes to a consensus. She increased her work output for MSA and this in turn helped her to strengthen her leadership skills, said Ali.
“It is important in terms of leadership skills to be able to have communication skills and have a personality where you can get people to work for you,” Ali said.

About working with other organizations, Ali said that MSA is working hard for collaborating panelist discussions among Christians and Jewish student organizations on campus. MSA invites guest speakers in terms of explaining about Islam to non-Muslims, she said it is not as if they are converting them but to tell them about the beauty of Islam.

In their next inter-faith event, MSA along with Intervarsity Christian Organization, and Jewish Students Organization, will discuss different perspectives of Prophet Abraham (as), said Ali.
Ali said that MSA is in a process of getting a prayer room in the student center or at the undergraduate library at the Wayne State. Instead of calling it a prayer room, they will name it a meditation room so anyone can come, she said.

With her hard work, she is motivating other students to join and become active, said Nayeem Amin, an active MSA member and a freshman at the Wayne State. He said that Ali is creative in her approach to have parties for female members as well as similar bonding events.

Ali’s family moved around a lot because of her father’s job. Since 2001, she has been in Michigan where she started with her high school. She said this was as long she ever lived at one place.

She has finally achieved her dream by playing a pivotal role in a development of the MSA of Wayne State.
She is a young woman who is unafraid to speak her mind, and stand behind what she believes in.
She is truly a driving force within the Muslim community, Shafer said.

“Her understanding of other’s views, keeping in touch with the ideas, attitudes, and moods of the MSA’s members, her creative outlook on how to bring the members close together, for the greater cause of the betterment of humanity, makes her an excellent president,” Amin said.

9-14

… an inspirational individual who has been inspiring women across the globe and across religions

By Mahvish Akhtar, Muslim Media News Service (MMNS)

Q1. Tell me a little bit about yourself…your background.

I’m a Catholic American woman who was raised mainly by a single mother with three older brothers. I attended Catholic schools but graduated from a state university.

Q2. How did you come to be so involved with Muslim causes?

I became interested in Muslims issues after September 11, 2001, as did many Americans, because I wanted to find out why they hated Americans so much that they would kill us in such a horrible and cruel manner. What I discovered, among many other things, was that Muslims had a legitimate grievance against my country because of our bias support of Israel against the Palestinians. I never understood the real issue surrounding the Israeli/Palestinian issue, since our media is controlled by Zionists. I realized that we Americans were being manipulated into hating Muslims so that we would fight Israel’s enemies in the Middle East. By the way, in my research into the events surrounding 9/11, I have concluded that 9/11 was an inside job, perpetrated by people loyal toIsrael inside our government; most likely aided by Israeli Mossad agents. Americans are as much victims of the Zionists as the Palestinians are; only the Palestinians know very clearly who their enemies are, while most Americans have been fooled into believing the Muslims are our enemies.

Q3. How do you feel women can contribute in helping the situation of the world?

Women can contribute to the situation in the world in many different ways. The first and most obvious manner is by raising children who believe in truth and justice for all, and by instilling in our children respect for human rights of all peoples in this world. While I still believe that women’s greatest role is motherhood, I also believe that women can be active in the professional world if that is what they choose. I believe women have the right to an education and that no woman should ever have to accept physical or psychological abuse. But I think many women choose to have a career outside the home for the wrong reasons, perhaps to feel more modern or sophisticated, and unfortunately, their children are neglected. It’s a delicate balance, but I believe that raising the next generation to stand for peace and justice is the most noble contribution women can make to the world.Motherhood is a great blessing. Too many modern women forget this. Q4. How did you get to know so much about Islam and Muslim Women?As I mentioned earlier, I began researching the Islamic world after 9/11 and I discovered that most of what we had been brainwashed into believing aboutMuslims was not true. I also took the time to speak with Muslim Americans about their views on politics and their opinions about wearing hijab, for example, and was surprised that most of the Muslim women with whom I spoke actually enjoyed wearing hijab and felt it was an honor and mark of respect. I began to admire their modesty and self-respect and I realized that any culture in which women are modest and traditional is set up by Zionists to be liberalized. But not for the benefit of the women as they say. Rather, to corrupt them and ultimately destroy their culture and society. Breaking up the family is the surest way to ruin a society, and convincing women to become sexually promiscuous is not in the women’s best interest.

Q5. Do you feel that Muslim women play a strong role in our communities…where ever they might be?

I believe that in most societies, even societies that are labeled patriarchal, the women are truly the head of the family. They have the greatest influence over the children, and although the men may officially be the head of the family, women have always known how to direct things in the manner that is best for the whole family. As my mother once told me when I was a child: the smart woman lets the man think he’s the head of the household! I’m sure Muslim women are the same way. They are the heart and soul of their families.

Q6. How do you define modernism verses oppression in regards to women?

Modernism and oppression are two extremes. If by modernism you mean what we have in the West, then I reject modernism. Feminism as it has been practiced in the West since the 1960s has been most destructive for women. The feminists pretended to want to liberate women from their roles as wives and mothers and let them be free to work, have their own homes, and be sexually liberal. But the truth is that these things do not bring happiness to a woman. A woman can only be truly fulfilled in her role as wife and mother. She can also have a successful career, but ask any career woman who has no children of her own, and she will tell you that she would trade all of her professional success to have even one child. Oppression is the opposite extreme, in which women have no rights. A healthy balance is best for women and for society in general.

Q7. Most people today see the West namely United States as modern and free and many Muslims urge Muslim women to adapt their ways…what would you say to those people?

I would strongly encourage Muslim women to continue to wear hijab. They can be modern in the sense that they attend university and have careers, but the moment they become seduced into losing their modesty, the evil ones have already started to win them over. At first it seems innocent enough. Just dress a little bit more revealingly and be more like women in the West. Then they will start to seduce you more and more with the idea of loosening your sexual morality, then comes abortion and promiscuity. All of this leads to misery for women. Women are safest and happiest when they dress modestly and keep their sexuality only for their husbands.

Q8. What is the first thing about American women that you would like to change or fix?

The first thing I would like to fix about American women is exactly what I described above. I look at old photographs of women of my grandmother’s generation and I can see that they wore long, beautiful dresses. They did not wear veils, but they definitely did not wear short skirts or show their legs in any way. Then I look at pictures of the 1960s and see that women first started to wear short skirts and much more revealing clothing and that is when the divorce rates increased (now 50% in the U.S.), abortions increased, and it became impossible for women to earn the love of a man without sex. My advice to American women is to dress modestly and do not have sexual relations until they’re married. If a man does not love her enough to wait, then he is not worthy of her. Modesty, modesty, modesty!

Q9. What similarities do you find between Muslim women and Christian women?

The similarities between Muslim woman and Christian women are that we are all women so we have the same emotions, with a deep capacity to love, and also a deep capacity to be hurt. That is why it is necessary for women to protect themselves emotionally by being modest. This sends the message to men they we are not sexual toys and reinforces within ourselves the idea that we are worthy of respect and honor based on who we are and not on how we look. Both our religions are very traditional in terms of sexual morality and the roles of men and women, but since the West has been corrupted, it’s hard to find Christian women who realize that being immodest is actually un-Christian. I think veils are very beautiful and innocent and I admire Muslim women who wear them with pride.

Q10. Do you think that things will change one day for women? Will we ever get out of male oppression as a whole?

As I mentioned earlier, it is necessary to strike a balance between modernism and oppression. Both are extremes, and, ironically, modernism is just a different form of oppression of women. Instead of women being oppressed by men by not being allowed out of the house for example, modernism oppresses women by making us lonely, sexually abused slaves with no children. We can find the right balance, but it will require women remaining modest while fighting for rights such as education and freedom from domestic abuse. Don’t go too far and listen to the Western feminists, most of whom are not Christians by the way. They are liars

Q11. Who has been a great influence in your life?

Mother Teresa of Calcutta was a great influence on me. Obviously, she wore a veil as a Catholic nun! But it was her great love of all humanity and especially the poor that had such an impact on me. I actually thought of becoming a nun like her but I did not think that was what God was calling me to do. Maybe God is calling me to warn other women not to make the mistakes we women in the West have made. I know from experience that the sexual freedom promised by the liars is the worst form of slavery. Mother Teresa would have agreed.

9-14

Dinner and Silent Auction for the Children of Sudan

By Dana Inayah Cann, MMNS

March 22–Dearborn–Amnesty International presented a silent auction and dinner on the campus of U of M Dearborn titled Orphans of Sudan: Suffering Behind the Shadows of War. The event was sponsored by Amnesty International of U of M Dearborn, the Quaker Oats Company, Islamic Relief, U of M Credit Union, Multicultural Association, Muslim Students’ Association at the U of M Dearborn and ASU.

Hosting the event with over one hundred people in attendance were Jozefina Kalaj and Abdullateef Muhiuddin.

Before the start of the event, a Powerpoint presentation was shown of the people of Sudan. Pictures included a woman in tears, dead bodies laid out in the dirt, and places that looked destroyed. The pictures were shown repeatedly throughout the event.

The first speaker was Suliman Giddo, president and CEO of The Dafur Peace and Development Organization. He was born and raised in Sudan. With a Powerpoint presentation, Giddo gave the audience a history of how the war in Sudan was started and how the Sudan government are not stepping in to help.

The war in Sudan began in 1955 after the Arab-led Khartoum government broke its promise to create a federal system for southern Sudan. During the 17 year civil war, 21 ethnic conflicts broke out and all were resolved by Agaweed (traditional mediators). Compensation and forgiveness were given to both sides.

A second civil war broke out in 1983, following the government’s Islamicization campaign, which incorporated traditional Islamic punishments drawn from Shari’a into the penal code. Because these laws were also imposed on southerners and non-Muslims in the north, it led to a civil war that continues still continues til today.

The crimes committed since the war have displaced 3,220,000 from their homes; 400,000 have been killed, and 240,000 refugees are now in Chad.

Giddo stated that everyone should step in to help the people of Sudan since the government of Sudan isn’t doing much. Though a cease fire agreement has been established in 2004, and an African Union Forces unit has created a mission of 36 months in Darfur, no significant security changes have occurred.

There is a “weak mandate, a lack of experience, logistics, confidences, command, communication and funding” according to Giddo.

In order for Sudan to succeed, Giddo says that they should “strengthen African troops, disarm the Janjaweed and rebels, give a fair trial to perpetrators, give fair compensation and repatriation and have political settlement for all states in Sudan.”

“I believe that war is neither an ideal nor an effective war for conflict resolute. It is not too late to continue peaceful negotiations in good faith,” said Giddo.

Following Giddo’s presentation, the audience ate and went into the adjoining room to view the pictures and make bids for the silent auction.

After dinner and the auction, Professor Saeed Khan of Wayne State University spoke about Sudan and the efforts taken to help.

Saeed stated that the Darfur crisis is not just manmade, but it is also because of natural disaster. 95,000 have lost their lives when the land dried up due to a shortage of rainfall.

“The drought is but a system of what is befalling Sudan,” said Khan. “The Sahara dessert is becoming more dry, which is diminishing the resources for the population.”

Citing the media for not giving the people of Sudan enough attention, Khan also placed accountability on the Muslim world, wondering if Muslims have a passive look of what’s going on like everyone else. In the past few years, the attentions of Muslims have been in Iraq, Palestine and Homeland Security.

Khan also said that to the U.S., the crisis in Sudan is not an important issue right now, but that other economic resources such as oil in the eastern part of Sudan is.

Khan then went on to talk about how Amnesty International has “been on the forefront, proclaiming and exposing” the crisis in Sudan and asking people to “bear witness to what is happening.”

“I fear that your children will be talking about Darfur,” said Khan. “You can make a difference for tonight…you can make a difference for the rest of the nights. If you cannot help with your hands you can speak out against it with your own mouth. Bear witness. Speak out.”

After Professor Khan spoke, members of the audience enjoyed desert, while others left the room to make maghrib.

Caption: Professor Saeed Khan addresses an audience of Muslims and others who are concerned about reported atrocities in the Darfur region of Sudan.

Twenty minutes later, Carmen Middletent, an Australian native who now lives in Detroit, spoke of how she grew up in foster homes before moving to the United States and how a woman inspired her to became an Australian artist. Several pieces of Middletent’s work was donated for the silent auction.

Pamphlets and envelopes were made available for the audience to make donations.

To help support and learn about the people of Sudan, you may contact Amnesty International, Islamic Relief and The Darfur Peace and Development Organization.

CAIR Runs Huge Gala Banquet with Many Prominent Michigan Muslims

By Adil James, MMNS

Dearborn–Sunday March 25–CAIR Michigan and most of Southeast Michigan’s prominent Muslim leadership attended a fundraiser showcasing CAIR’s recent accomplishments, with promienent speakers and imams from the community and abroad in attendance, including the keynote speaker, journalist Robert Fisk.

The event was unusual because it was held during the day, unlike most other such banquets. It was held at the Hyatt Regency in Dearborn, filling a huge banquet hall with 110 tables and about 1,100 guests. Imam Dawud Walid, Executive Director of CAIR Michigan, explained that CAIR was somewhat disappointed with the money that was raised during the event, falling short of its goal. This year’s banquet, despite its elaborate preparation and despite its being very well-attended by all groups of Michigan Muslims, made thousands of dollars less than even last year’s event (which raised about $150,000).

CAIR Michigan needs your support, so you may wish to support them–when you have a problem involving discrimination you will call them–so maybe it is better to help them now, before your hour of need.

Present were many distinguished Muslims, including Imam Qazwini of the Islamic Center of America, Imam Moosa of the Bloomfield Muslim Unity Center, Imam Elahi of the Islamic House of Wisdom, and many others of great stature in the community.

There was a video presentation by CAIR Michigan which showed the many accomplishments of CAIR, and which announced that CAIR had processed 16,000 discrimination cases, engaging anti-Muslim voices on many fronts including callous and stereo-typing anti-Muslim advertising, the pope’s oblique attack on Islam, the use by President Bush of the term “Islamofascist,” (CAIR claimed its advocacy stopped the president from using that phrase), not to mention many cases of employment discrimination and cases of discrimination on airplanes.

Unfortunately, CAIR Michigan, said Dawud Walid, had already received as of late March 2007 the same number of discrimination complaints that it had received in all of 2006–a very disturbing trend. Such complaints involved hate mail to mosques, radio announcements of hatred, hatred directed at Muslim students by ignorant professors, and more. Even 2006 had seen a 30% climb in number of discrimination claims over previous years.

Imam Walid emphasized to the audience at the Hyatt Regency that CAIR does not depend on corporate sponsorships, and is dependent instead on donations from individuals. He thanked the community for its support.

Keynote speaker Robert Fisk spoke eloquently for about 40 minutes on the political and historical dimensions of today’s conflict in Iraq, pointing out historical parallels from the time of the crusades until the present, including the British invasion of the same land.

A fascinating fact he mentioned was that in fact during the crusades the total number of Christian soldiers in the Middle East was, adjusted for population, 22 times less than the total number of soldiers from Christian nations currently based in the Middle East. He decried the incomplete reporting of the major networks on Iraq, saying that every newspaper had failed to get a recent story of a list of insurgent demands that had been announced by a major insurgent group. He described parallels between the current impasse in the Iraq war with previous wars between France and Algeria and other wars. He also emphasized that maps showing different populations (Sunni, Shi’a, Kurds) in different areas are actually the thin end of a wedge that is being driven between the peoples of Iraq–before the war its peoples had lived in peace, but they have since been incited to war with one another. He emphasized also that during the Shah’s time, Iran had been encouraged in its nuclear ambitions. He also went into some detail describing how from the time of Napoleon until the present, the West had offered a democracy of sorts many times to the Middle East–but in fact the democracy they wanted to bring there was not real democracy because many political players were deemed too dangerous to Western interests to allow in power.

After his speech, Mr. Fisk received a long and rowdy standing ovation from the 1100 audience members for his description of current events in their historical context.

Imam Ali Leyla of IAGD held a brief fundraising effort immediately after Mr. Fisk’s speech.

The event was, despite its failure to reach its fundraising target, a tremendous organizational success, showcasing the togetherness, comity, and organizational capacity of Michigan’s Muslim communities.

9-14

Rally For Working People

There was a March & Rally organized by the Coalition of the Working People and the Poor. The demonstration attracted a diverse crowd of approximately 200-400 people. After a short march the crowd convened at the steps of City hall to chant and hear speeches by community activists and politicians. The raucous chants of the crowd advocated raising the federal minimum wage, healthcare for all, and adequate funding of human needs programs.

Many of the speeches were quite poignant and the crowd responded enthusiastically. Judge Al Green said that we need to start helping out “the least, the last, and the lost.” He noted that the federal poverty line for a single parent with a child is $13,000, while the yearly minimum wage is just $10,000.

Bishop James Dixon emotionally decried the disparities in this country. “There is a group of children” he said, “that worry about baseball and soccer practice while there is another group of children that worry about whether or not the lights will still be on when they get home.” He also stated that minimum wage has been set for 10 years while inflation has risen by 27% in the same period.

The City of Houston Councilperson Peter Brown declared that “more and more Houston is becoming a city of the haves and the have-nots.” He noted that a quarter of Houston children are at or below the poverty line. There were also rousing speeches by Carol Alvarado, Robert Mohammed, Herb Rothschild and others.

One subject that was not mentioned was transportation for low-income people. Given that one-way trips on Metro commonly take upwards of 2 hours a case can be made that Houston’s transportation situation perpetuates the cycle of poverty. Well, only so many pressing issues can be squeezed into one rally.

Pakistan Consulate Organized National Day Event

The 67th National Day was observed with traditional zeal and fervor worldwide by Pakistanis. The Consulate General of Pakistan in Houston celebrated with expatriates Pakistanis as a day to make resolution of making the home country a strong, progressive and enlightened state.

National flag of Pakistan was hoisted by Consul General G. R. Baluch and Community Dignitaries. He introduced to those present the glamorous exhibits of “Ten Thousand Villages”: A project which markets the handicrafts and of tens and thousands of artisans across the globe including Pakistan. For more information of this outstanding program, one can visit http://www.villageshouston.org/

Consul General G. R. Baluch later on read the special messages of President General Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Shukat Aziz. The gist of the messages was that Founder of the Nation Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah dreamt of a Pakistan that was moderate, developed, prosperous and strong. It is as such obligation of present day Pakistanis to turn this dream into reality, and pledge it to the nation to take Pakistan to the stage, as was visualized by Quaid-e-Azam and Poet of Pakistan Allama Muhammad Iqbal. The country’s Armed Forces are combating the threats of extremism and terrorism, whether it was in FATA or in Balochistan.

For more information on Pakistan Consulate General, please visit 11850 Jones Road – Houston – Texas 77070.

9-14

Courtesy Fars News Agency

TEHRAN–An informed source said here in Tehran on Tuesday that after terrorists’ hideout in Iran’s southeastern city of Zahedan was conquered, Iranian police discovered several US-made remote controlled detonators there.

Speaking to FNA, the source expressed deep concern about the US intentions and plots for sowing discord between Shiite and Sunnite Muslims, specially inside Iran.

He further pointed out that remote controlled detonators are used when the explosion is intended to result in vast tolls, adding, “The device shows that the US had intended to foment a bloody war between the Shiites and Sunnites.”

A bomb blast tore through a bus in Zahedan, southeast Iran at 06:10 (2:40 GMT) on Wednesday, killing 12 people and wounding 31 others.

The bus belonged to the Zahedan branch of the Islamic Republic’s Mobilized Forces (Baseej), and the passengers were all members of the ground force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).

Earlier a source said that the relevant documents, photographs and film footages showing that the explosives and arsenals used in the attack were American would be presented to the public and media in the near future.

He further pointed out that the terrorist group ‘Jondollah’ had several plots for assassinating Sunni and tribal leaders to sow discord and foment conflicts between the Shiite and Sunnite citizens in Sistan and Balouchestan province.

Iran on Saturday invited international bodies to send envoys to Tehran to witness documents and other corroborative evidence showing involvement of foreign countries in recent terrorist blasts in the country’s southeastern provincial capital city of Zahedan.

Director General for the political affairs of Sistan and Balouchestan governorate Soltan-Ali Mir told FNA that the US and Britain are behind the recent terrorist attacks in the city of Zahedan, adding, “Washington and London are facing serious challenges as their interests in the Middle-East region have been endangered. Since the Islamic Republic is the main center of anti-US struggles, they are seeking to trouble Iran through a series of challenges, including terrorist attacks and unrests.”

Asked to elaborate on the documents proving involvement of the US and Britain in recent incidents in Iran’s Sistan and Balouchestan province, he said, “The weapons that the terrorists have used are US and British made. Moreover, the arrested terrorist agents have confessed that they have been trained by English-speaking people.”

The official invited representatives of the United Nations, Human Rights watch and other international bodies to dispatch envoys to Iran to observe the available documents and proofs substantiating involvement of the Untied States and Britain in the recent terrorist attacks, including the blast and shootout on Wednesday.

“The US and Britain, which allege to be pioneers in the campaign against terrorism, are themselves actually defending the terrorists, training them and providing them with the needed media and financial supports and facilities,” he added.

Soltan-Ali Mir further pointed out that the US and Britain intend to create a series of incidents in his province similar to what they have already done in Iraq.

“They intend to kill the Shiites and leave the footsteps at the door of the Sunnis or vice versa. Some of the arrestees confessed that they had plans to assassinate religious and tribal leaders of the Sunnis and put the blame on the Shiites in a bid to foment ethnic and religious conflicts,” he stated.

The official also noted Iran’s good and friendly relations with the neighboring countries, and said that Iranian and Pakistani officials will soon attend meetings to improve security at the borders.

Meanwhile, he called on the security officials of Iran’s eastern neighbors to take the required precautions to secure their joint borders with Iran, saying that it is now the Islamic Republic which is paying a heavy price for securing the borders and that neighboring countries should enhance their efforts to prevent terrorists from trafficking across the border.

Following the Saturday report about the use of US manufactured weapons in the recent terrorist operations in Iran’s southeastern province of Sistan and Balouchestan, a security official provided FNA with a photograph of the said weaponry.

The arsenals have been confiscated during a raid on the hideout of a terrorist group known as Jondollah in the provincial capital city of Zahedan on Thursday.

9-14

AP

Kuala Lumpur: Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad urged Iraqi insurgents yesterday to make the United States “pay a very high price” for its occupation of Iraq.

In his most provocative public remarks on the Iraq war yet, Mahathir said he wanted to “congratulate the Iraqi resistance” for successfully turning public opinion against US President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair.

“Make sure that the Americans will pay a very high price for their adventure,” Mahathir said at an international anti-war conference in Kuala Lumpur.

“Unfortunately, you may have to kill a lot of Americans. When the coffins go back, when the body bags are carried back to America, it will help the Americans to change their minds,” Mahathir said to loud applause from 1,500 activists.

Strong critic Mahathir, long known for his strident criticism of Western countries, said American soldiers will go to Iraq “and many of them are going to die. They are going to go back in their coffins.”

“If President Bush is willing to lead his army, but from the front, then by all means let’s all go to war,” he said. “But since he’s not going to do that, I think we should strive with all our might to spread the new faith, the new belief that war is not an option, war is not a way of settling any dispute.”

War crimes tribunal

Mahathir spoke after launching a tribunal that plans to hold trials based on complaints by Iraqis and Palestinians against world leaders including Bush, Blair, Australian Prime Minister John Howard and Israeli ex-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.

The Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Tribunal, which opened with a preliminary meeting, does not have the legal authority of an international organisation and cannot impose penalties, but its main aim is to condemn leaders in history books, Mahathir said.

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The following is the actual Lancet Survey which is frequently referred to in the media. This survey, through accepted best practice statistical analysis determined that approximately 610,000 Iraqis had been killed since the March ’03 invasion. This survey was recently acknowledged by the UK government to have been legitimate.

To see original report complete with charts and tables, visit http://www.thelancet.com.

Summary

Background

An excess mortality of nearly 100 000 deaths was reported in Iraq for the period March, 2003–September, 2004, attributed to the invasion of Iraq. Our aim was to update this estimate.

Methods

Between May and July, 2006, we did a national cross-sectional cluster sample survey of mortality in Iraq. 50 clusters were randomly selected from 16 Governorates, with every cluster consisting of 40 households. Information on deaths from these households was gathered.
Findings

Three misattributed clusters were excluded from the final analysis; data from 1849 households that contained 12 801 individuals in 47 clusters was gathered. 1474 births and 629 deaths were reported during the observation period. Pre-invasion mortality rates were 5·5 per 1000 people per year (95% CI 4·3–7·1), compared with 13·3 per 1000 people per year (10·9–16·1) in the 40 months post-invasion. We estimate that as of July, 2006, there have been 654 965 (392 979–942 636) excess Iraqi deaths as a consequence of the war, which corresponds to 2·5% of the population in the study area. Of post-invasion deaths, 601 027 (426 369–793 663) were due to violence, the most common cause being gunfire.

Interpretation

The number of people dying in Iraq has continued to escalate. The proportion of deaths ascribed to coalition forces has diminished in 2006, although the actual numbers have increased every year. Gunfire remains the most common cause of death, although deaths from car bombing have increased.
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Introduction

There has been widespread concern over the scale of Iraqi deaths after the invasion by the US-led coalition in March, 2003. Various methods have been used to count violent deaths, including hospital death data from the Ministry of Health, mortuary tallies, and media reports.1,2 The best known is the Iraq Body Count, which estimated that, up to September 26, 2006, between 43 491 and 48 283 Iraqis have been killed since the invasion.1 Estimates from the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior were 75% higher than those based on the Iraq Body Count from the same period.2 An Iraqi non-governmental organisation, Iraqiyun, estimated 128 000 deaths from the time of the invasion until July, 2005, by use of various sources, including household interviews.3

The US Department of Defence keeps some records of Iraqi deaths, despite initially denying that they did.4 Recently, Iraqi casualty data from the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) Significant Activities database were released.5 These data estimated the civilian casuality rate at 117 deaths per day between May, 2005, and June, 2006, on the basis of deaths that occurred in events to which the coalition responded. There also have been several surveys that assessed the burden of conflict on the population.6–8 These surveys have predictably produced substantially higher estimates than the passive surveillance reports.

Aside from violence, insufficient water supplies, non-functional sewerage, and restricted electricity supply also create health hazards.9,10 A deteriorating health service with insecure access, and the flight of health professionals adds further risks. People displaced by the on-going sectarian violence add to the number of vulnerable individuals. In many conflicts, these indirect causes have accounted for most civilian deaths.11,12

In 2004, we did a survey of 33 randomly selected clusters of 30 households with a mean of eight residents throughout Iraq to determine the excess mortality during the 17·8 months after the 2003 invasion.8 The survey estimated excess mortality of at least 98 000 (95% CI 8000–194 000) after excluding, as an outlier, the high mortality reported in the Falluja cluster. Over half of excess deaths recorded in the 2004 study were from violent causes, and about half of the violent deaths occurred in Falluja.

To determine how on-going events in Iraq have affected mortality rates subsequently, we repeated a national household survey between May and July, 2006. We measured deaths from January, 2002, to July, 2006, which included the period of the 2004 survey.

Methods

Participants and procedures

To measure mortality we did a national cross-sectional cohort study of deaths from January, 2002, through July, 2006. Household information was gathered about deaths that occurred between January 1, 2002, and the invasion of March 18, 2003, in all households and these data were compared with deaths that occurred from the time of the invasion through to the date of survey. A sample size of 12 000 was calculated to be adequate to identify a doubling of an estimated pre-invasion crude mortality rate of 5·0 per 1000 people per year with 95% confidence and a power of 80%, and was chosen to balance the need for robust data with the level of risk acceptable to field teams. Sampling followed the same approach used in 2004,8 except that selection of survey sites was by random numbers applied to streets or blocks rather than with global positioning units (GPS), since surveyors felt that being seen with a GPS unit could put their lives at risk. The use of GPS units might be seen as targeting an area for air strikes, or that the unit was in reality a remote detonation control. By confining the survey to a cluster of houses close to one another it was felt the benign purpose of the survey would spread quickly by word of mouth among households, thus lessening risk to interviewers.

As a first stage of sampling, 50 clusters were selected systematically by Governorate with a population proportional to size approach, on the basis of the 2004 UNDP/Iraqi Ministry of Planning population estimates (table 1). At the second stage of sampling, the Governorate’s constituent administrative units were listed by population or estimated population, and location(s) were selected randomly proportionate to population size. The third stage consisted of random selection of a main street within the administrative unit from a list of all main streets. A residential street was then randomly selected from a list of residential streets crossing the main street. On the residential street, houses were numbered and a start household was randomly selected. From this start household, the team proceeded to the adjacent residence until 40 households were surveyed. For this study, a household was defined as a unit that ate together, and had a separate entrance from the street or a separate apartment entrance.

The two survey teams each consisted of two female and two male interviewers, with the field manager (RL) serving as supervisor. All were medical doctors with previous survey and community medicine experience and were fluent in English and Arabic. A 2-day training session was held. Decisions on sampling sites were made by the field manager. The interview team were given the responsibility and authority to change to an alternate location if they perceived the level of insecurity or risk to be unacceptable. In every cluster, the numbers of households where no-one was at home or where participation was refused were recorded. In every cluster, queries were made about any household that had been present during the survey period that had ceased to exist because all members had died or left. Empty houses or those that refused to participate were passed over until 40 households had been interviewed in all locations.

The survey purpose was explained to the head of household or spouse, and oral consent was obtained. Participants were assured that no unique identifiers would be gathered. No incentives were provided. The survey listed current household members by sex, and asked who had lived in this household on January 1, 2002. The interviewers then asked about births, deaths, and in-migration and out-migration, and confirmed that the reported inflow and exit of residents explained the differences in composition between the start and end of the recall period. Separation of combatant from non-combatant deaths during interviews was not attempted, since such information would probably be concealed by household informants, and to ask about this could put interviewers at risk. Deaths were recorded only if the decedent had lived in the household continuously for 3 months before the event. Additional probing was done to establish the cause and circumstances of deaths to the extent feasible, taking into account family sensitivities. At the conclusion of household interviews where deaths were reported, surveyors requested to see a copy of any death certificate and its presence was recorded. Where differences between the household account and the cause mentioned on the certificate existed, further discussions were sometimes needed to establish the primary cause of death.

The study received ethical approval from the Committee on Human Research of the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, MD, USA, and the School of Medicine, Al Mustansiriya University, Baghdad, Iraq.

Statistical analysis

Data entry and analysis was done with Microsoft Excel, SPSS version 12.0, and STATA version 8. Period mortality rates were calculated on the basis of the mid-interval population and with regression models. Mortality rates and relative risks of mortality were estimated with log-linear regression models in STATA.13 To estimate the relative risk, we used a model that allowed for a baseline rate of mortality and a distinct relative rate for three 14-month intervals post-invasion—March, 2003–April, 2004, May, 2004–May, 2005, and June, 2005–June, 2006. The SE for mortality rates were calculated with robust variance estimation that took into account the correlation between rates of death within the same cluster over time.14 The log-linear regression model assumed that the variation in mortality rates across clusters is proportional to the average mortality rate; to assess the effect of this assumption we also obtained non-parametric CIs by use of bootstrapping.13,15 As an additional sensitivity analysis, we assessed the effect of differences across clusters by extending models to allow the baseline mortality rate to vary by cluster. We estimated the numbers of excess deaths (attributable rates) by subtraction of the predicted values for the pre-war mortality rates from the post-war mortality rates in the three post-invasion periods. Mortality projections with model rates were applied to 2004 mid-year population estimates for Iraq, minus the population of Dahuk and Muthanna, which were not sampled, to ascertain mortality projections.9

Role of the funding source

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which was the major funder, had no role in the collection or the analysis of the data, or the preparation of the publication. The Johns Hopkins Center for Refugee and Disaster Response used some general funds to cover research expense. All authors had full access to all the data; the corresponding author had final responsibility to submit for publication.

Results

The survey was done between May 20 and July 10, 2006. Only 47 of the sought 50 clusters were included in this analysis. On two occasions, miscommunication resulted in clusters not being visited in Muthanna and Dahuk, and instead being included in other Governorates. In Wassit, insecurity caused the team to choose the next nearest population area, in accordance with the study protocol. Later it was discovered that this second site was actually across the boundary in Baghdad Governorate. These three misattributed clusters were therefore excluded, leaving a final sample of 1849 households in 47 randomly selected clusters. In 16 (0·9%) dwellings, residents were absent; 15 (0·8%) households refused to participate. In the few apartment houses visited, the team progressed to the nearest households within the building. One team could typically complete a cluster of 40 households in 1 day. No interviewers died or were injured during the survey.

Households where all members were dead or had gone away were reported in only one cluster in Ninewa and these deaths are not included in this report. The 1849 households that completed the survey had 12 801 household members at the time of the survey; thus, the mean household size was 6·9 people. Of the 12 529 residents whose sex was recorded, 6123 (48·9%) were male. The study population at the beginning of the recall period (January 1, 2002) was calculated to be 11 956, and a total of 1474 births and 629 deaths were reported during the study period; age was reported for 610 of 629 deaths, sex reporting was complete. During the survey period there were 129 households (7%) that reported in-migration, and 152 households (8%) reported out-migration. Survey teams asked for death certificates in 545 (87%) reported deaths and these were present in 501 cases. The pattern of deaths in households without death certificates was no different from those with certificates.

Of the 629 deaths reported, 547 (87%) were in the post-invasion period (March, 2003, to June, 2006) compared with 82 (13%) in the pre-invasion period (January, 2002, to March, 2003; table 2). Most deaths (n=485; 77%) were in males, and this was true for both periods, but more pronounced in the pre-invasion period (57 of 82 deaths pre-invasion vs 428 of 547 deaths post-invasion). The male-to-female ratio of post-invasion deaths was 3·4 for all deaths, and 9·8 for violent deaths (all deaths: 144 female, 485 male; violent death: 28 female, 274 male). In general, deaths by age group followed the expected J-shaped demographic curve; however, by contrast, most deaths in males were in the middle age groups (figure 1).

The crude mortality rate in the pre-invasion period was 5·5 per 1000 people per year (95% CI 4·3–7·1) and for the overall post-invasion period was 13·3 per 1000 people per year (10·9–16·1; table 3). A four-fold increase in the crude mortality rate was recorded during the study period, with a high of 19·8 per 1000 people per year (14·6–26·7) between June, 2005, and June, 2006 (figure 2 and table 3).

Post-invasion excess mortality rates showed much the same escalating trend, rising from 2·6 per 1000 people per year (0·6–4·7) above the baseline rate in 2003 to 14·2 per 1000 people per year (8·6–21·5) in 2006 (figure 2 and table 3). Excess mortality is attributed mainly to an increase in the violent death rate; however, an increase in the non-violent death rate was noted in the later part of the post-invasion period (2005–06). The post-invasion non-violent excess mortality rate was 0·7 per 1000 people per year (−1·2 to 3·0).

Of the 302 conflict-related violent deaths reported, 300 (99%) were post-invasion (table 4). An increase in violent death rates was seen in the post-invasion period (figure 2). Analysis for trend showed that this rate for violent deaths increased significantly in every period after the invasion (p<0·0001) compared with the pre-invasion period. Of the 302 violent deaths, 274 (91%) were of men, and within this group, deaths concentrated in the 15–29 and 30–44 year old age groups (figure 1). Most violent deaths were due to gunshots (56%); air strikes, car bombs, and other explosions/ordnance each accounted for 13–14% of violent deaths. The number of deaths from gunshots increased consistently over the post-invasion period, and a sharp increase in deaths from car bombs was noted in 2006. Violent deaths that were directly attributed to coalition forces or to air strikes were classified as coalition violent deaths. In many other cases the responsible party was not known, or the households were hesitant to specifically identify them. Deaths attributable to the coalition accounted for 31% (95% CI 26–37) of post-invasion violent deaths. The proportion of violent deaths attributable to the coalition was much the same across periods (p=0·058). However, the actual number of violent deaths, including those that resulted from coalition forces, increased every year after the invasion. Deaths in men of military age, defined as 15–44 years of age, were disproportionately high and accounted for 59% (52–65) of post-invasion violent deaths, despite this subgroup accounting for only 24·4% of the Iraqi population.16 No difference in the proportion of violent deaths in men of military age was noted between deaths attributed to the coalition or other/unknown sources (p=0·168). Mortality rates by Governorate are shown in figure 3. Death rates due to violent causes per Governorate

Mortality rates in Governorates with fewer than three clusters were confirmed with 2004 survey data; estimates for provinces with fewer than three clusters that could not be confirmed are potentially uncertain due to the small sample size.

Of the 327 non-violent deaths that were reported, 80 (24%) occurred pre-invasion and 247 (76%) occurred post-invasion (table 2). Non-violent mortality rates before and after invasion are shown in table 3. The mortality rates from non-violent causes were essentially unchanged until the first 6 months of 2006, at which point they increased by almost two deaths per 1000 people per year; however, this increase was not significant.

The male-to-female ratio of non-violent deaths was 1·8 (211 male vs 116 female deaths; p<0·0001). 17% of non-violent deaths occurred in those aged under 15 years, 32% in 15–59 year olds, and 52% in those over 60 years. Non-violent deaths by time, age, and cause are described in table 2. Cardiovascular conditions were the main cause of non-violent death and accounted for 37% of non-violent deaths over the entire study period. Other notable sources of non-violent mortality included cancer (14%), chronic illnesses (13%), infant deaths (12%), accidents (11%), and old age (8%). Causes of non-violent deaths were much the same both pre-invasion and post-invasion (p=0·290). We estimate that between March 18, 2003, and June, 2006, an additional 654 965 (392 979–942 636) Iraqis have died above what would have been expected on the basis of the pre-invasion crude mortality rate as a consequence of the coalition invasion. Of these deaths, we estimate that 601 027 (426 369–793 663) were due to violence. Discussion

We estimate that, as a consequence of the coalition invasion of March 18, 2003, about 655 000 Iraqis have died above the number that would be expected in a non-conflict situation, which is equivalent to about 2·5% of the population in the study area. About 601 000 of these excess deaths were due to violent causes. Our estimate of the post-invasion crude mortality rate represents a doubling of the baseline mortality rate, which, by the Sphere standards, constitutes a humanitarian emergency.17

Our estimate of the pre-invasion crude or all-cause mortality rate is in close agreement with other sources.18,19 The post-invasion crude mortality rate increased significantly from pre-invasion figures, and showed a rising trend. The increasing number of violent deaths follows trends of bodies counted by mortuaries, as well as those reported in the media and by the Iraq Body Count.1,5,20

Application of the mortality rates reported here to the period of the 2004 survey8 gives an estimate of 112 000 (69 000–155 000) excess deaths in Iraq in that period. Thus, the data presented here validates our 2004 study, which conservatively estimated an excess mortality of nearly 100 000 as of September, 2004.

Our estimate of excess deaths is far higher than those reported in Iraq through passive surveillance measures.1,5 This discrepancy is not unexpected. Data from passive surveillance are rarely complete, even in stable circumstances, and are even less complete during conflict, when access is restricted and fatal events could be intentionally hidden. Aside from Bosnia,21 we can find no conflict situation where passive surveillance recorded more than 20% of the deaths measured by population-based methods. In several outbreaks, disease and death recorded by facility-based methods underestimated events by a factor of ten or more when compared with population-based estimates.11,22–25 Between 1960 and 1990, newspaper accounts of political deaths in Guatemala correctly reported over 50% of deaths in years of low violence but less than 5% in years of highest violence.26 Nevertheless, surveillance tallies are important in monitoring trends over time and in the provision of individual data, and these data track closely with our own findings (figure 4).

Trends in number of deaths reported by the Iraq Body Count and the MultiNational Corps-Iraq and the mortality rates found by this study

Mortality rates from violent causes have increased every year post-invasion. By mid-year 2006, 91 violent deaths had occurred in 6 months, compared with 27 post-invasion in 2003 and 77 in 2004, and 105 for 2005, suggesting that violence has escalated substantially. The attributed cause of these deaths has also changed with time. Our data show that gunfire is the major cause of death in Iraq, accounting for about half of all violent deaths. Deaths from air strikes were less commonly reported in 2006 than in 2003–04, but deaths from car explosions have increased since late 2005. The proportion of violent deaths attributed to coalition forces might have peaked in 2004; however, the actual number of Iraqi deaths attributed to coalition forces increased steadily through 2005. Deaths were not classified as being due to coalition forces if households had any uncertainty about the responsible party; consequently, the number of deaths and the proportion of violent deaths attributable to coalition forces could be conservative estimates. Distinguishing criminal murders from anti-coalition force actions was not possible in this survey.

Across Iraq, deaths and injuries from violent causes were concentrated in adolescent to middle age men. Although some were probably combatants, a number of factors would expose this group to more risk—eg, life style, automobile travel, and employment outside the home. The circumstances of a number of deaths from gunshots suggest assassinations or executions. Coalition forces have been reported as targeting all men of military age.27,28

From January, 2002, until the invasion in 2003, virtually all deaths in Iraq were from non-violent causes. The main causes of non-violent deaths were much the same as the leading causes of hospital deaths reported by the Ministry of Health in 2004 and 2005 (unpublished data). Death rates from non-violent causes remained essentially unchanged from pre-invasion levels until 2006, when they rose by 2·0 deaths per 1000 per year above the pre-invasion baseline, an increase that was not significant. We are unsure of the reason for the observed change in sex ratio of adults aged 15–59 years dying from non-violent causes between pre-invasion and post-invasion periods (table 2), or why deaths from cardiovascular causes rose after the invasion.

All surveys have potential for error and bias. The extreme insecurity during this survey could have introduced bias by restricting the size of teams, the number of supervisors, and the length of time that could be prudently spent in all locations, which in turn affected the size and nature of questionnaires. Further, calling back to households not available on the initial visit was felt to be too dangerous. Families, especially in households with combatants killed, could have hidden deaths. Under-reporting of infant deaths is a wide-spread concern in surveys of this type.29,30 Entire households could have been killed, leading to a survivor bias. The population data used for cluster selection were at least 2 years old, and if populations subsequently migrated from areas of high mortality to those with low mortality, the sample might have over-represented the high-mortality areas. The miscommunication that resulted in no clusters being interviewed in Duhuk and Muthanna resulted in our assuming that no excess deaths occurred in those provinces (with 5% of the population), which probably resulted in an underestimate of total deaths. Families could have reported deaths that did not occur, although this seems unlikely, since most reported deaths could be corroborated with a certificate. However, certificates might not be issued for young children, and in some places death certificates had stopped being issued; our 92% confirmation rate was therefore deemed to be reasonable.

Large-scale migration out of Iraq could affect our death estimates by decreasing population size. Out-migration could introduce inaccuracies if such a process took place predominantly in households with either high or low violent death history. Internal population movement would be less likely to affect results appreciably. However, the number of individual households with in-migration was much the same as those with out-migration in our survey.

Although interviewers used a robust process for identifying clusters, the potential exists for interviewers to be drawn to especially affected houses through conscious or unconscious processes. Although evidence of this bias does not exist, its potential cannot be dismissed.31 Furthermore, families might have misclassified information about the circumstances of death. Deaths could have been over or under-attributed to coalition forces on a consistent basis. The numbers of non-violent deaths were low, thus, estimation of trends with confidence was difficult. Not sampling two of the Governorates could have underestimated the total number of deaths, although these areas were generally known as low-violence Governorates. Finally, the sex of individuals who had died might not have been accurately reported by households. Female deaths could have been under-reported, or there might have been discomfort felt in reporting certain male deaths.

The striking similarity between the 2004 and 2006 estimates of pre-war mortality diminishes concerns about people’s ability to recall deaths accurately over a 4-year period. Likewise, the similar patterns of mortality over time documented in our survey and by other sources corroborate our findings about the trends in mortality over time.1,5,32

In Iraq, as with other conflicts, civilians bear the consequences of warfare. In the Vietnam war, 3 million civilians died; in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, conflict has been responsible for 3·8 million deaths; and an estimated 200 000 of a total population of 800 000 died in conflict in East Timor.33–35 Recent estimates are that 200 000 people have died in Darfur over the past 31 months.36 We estimate that almost 655 000 people—2·5% of the population in the study area—have died in Iraq. Although such death rates might be common in times of war, the combination of a long duration and tens of millions of people affected has made this the deadliest international conflict of the 21st century, and should be of grave concern to everyone.

At the conclusion of our 2004 study8 we urged that an independent body assess the excess mortality that we saw in Iraq. This has not happened. We continue to believe that an independent international body to monitor compliance with the Geneva Conventions and other humanitarian standards in conflict is urgently needed. With reliable data, those voices that speak out for civilians trapped in conflict might be able to lessen the tragic human cost of future wars.

Contributors

G Burnham, as principal investigator, was involved in the study design and ethical approval, took part in the analysis and interpretation of results, and led the writing of the paper. R Lafta managed the field survey in Iraq, participated in the study design and the analysis, interpretation, and preparation of the manuscript. S Doocy managed the study data and was involved in the analysis, interpretation, and the writing of the manuscript. L Roberts instigated the study and assisted with the analysis and interpretation of the data and the writing of the manuscript.

Conflict of interest statement

We declare that we have no conflict of interest.

Acknowledgments

We acknowledge the assistance of Scott Zeger in the study design and analysis, Elizabeth Johnson in the statistical analysis, Courtland Robinson and Stan Becker who helped with the demographic analysis, and Elizabeth Dzeng who assisted with data management. We express our deepest admiration for the dedicated Iraqi data collectors who have asked not to be identified. Funding was provided by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Center for Refugee and Disaster Response of the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health.

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defense spending report, from NPR

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