â€œSleepingâ€ with the Enemyâ€
By Geoffrey Cook, MMNS
Differences Between the U.S., Afghani and Indian Governments
Point Isabel, Point Richmond (Calif.)–Your author is taking his subtitle from a less than notable American film of several years ago to finish up his report on the recent Indian Ambassador to Kabulâ€™s comments , Gautam Mukhopadhaya.
At the moment your reporter finds himself at a lovely promontory pointing into San Francisco Bay, and it seems strange to be considering so many matters so far away that I begun two weeks ago from Berkeley. At that time I decided to divide the presentation into two parts because of its length.
Mukhopadhaya continued on how the political position amongst the American voters regarding Afghanistan was shifting away from support to criticism of official military policy in the Hindu Kush. Therefore, the District of Columbia had to change its tactics in response.
Pakistan operates in this War as it perceives to its own interests. Thus, the Ambassador deems that NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organizationâ€™s) allies in the Hindu Kush consider Rawalpindi to be unreliable — which is far from the truth in your writerâ€™s opinion.
Both the U.S. and Pakistan are targeting the Taliban, (but Islamabad only considers one branch of the Taliban to be hostile to their interests. The other four branches â€“ which are within their territory, too â€“ they do not consider a threat, and all these parties are comparatively accommodating to the other â€“ including Pakistan. Up to 80% of the Pakistani Taliban resides in the federally administered Northwest Provinces.)
The Americans and Pakistani Armies mutually oppose one â€œclanâ€ of Taliban, and they are fully within Islamabadâ€™s Federally Administered Territories. Thus, Peshawar sees no threat to their survival from the Afghani Taliban.
Further, Washington sees no alternative to the Karzai government that the District of Columbia (D.C.) perceives as militarily undependable. At the same time, the U.S. Administration comprehends Kazaiâ€™s Presidency to be a corruptible one â€“ an uneasy alliance to say the least!
In the London Conference on the Afghani conflict last January (2010), the European and Canadian allies supported the â€œAfghanizationâ€ of the War and the â€œregularizationâ€ (normalization) of our relations with the Taliban! This, hopefully, would lead to meaningful discussions and, eventually, peace within the Mountains! These talks should be mutually respectful between each party â€“ including the Taliban.
At same time, the Indian representative from New Delhiâ€™s Department of External Affairs had to take a dig at their traditional competitors: â€œWe need leadership from the Pakistanis!â€ (This struggle beyond the Khyber is an opportunity to bring these two South Asian nuclear neighbors closer together instead of tearing them further apart to the dangerous detriment to all!) His Excellency accused D.C. of a failure of leadership during this international crisis. To settle the military security, he urged U.S.-Pakistan operations. (Of course, the loss of Islamabadâ€™s national sovereignty would be totally unacceptable to its Muslim citizenry, and put the security of Pakistanâ€™s topography under question for its Western and regional allies!) Simultaneously, the Saudis close allies to both, are working with Islamabad and Washington to bring their policies closer together.
On the other hand, the Taliban itself is fed-up. The London Conference approved the Talibanâ€™s grasp of the countryside while NATO and the Afghani government would occupy the cities. This is not the battle plan of these â€œStudents.â€ They wish to hold the total fasces within the dry, cold hills, and their mindset is far from compromise at this time.
Yet the Americans presume that they have an upper hand, and, correspondingly, are in the position of strength to negotiate with their adversaries. Actually, it is the Pakistanis who are central for negotiating with the problem some Quetta branch of the Talibani. The Pakistani Army has already begun to begin dialogue in Baluchistan. Rawalpindi considers it has made some progress, and the Generals at their Military Headquarters are encouraged by their discourse with the irregular tribesmen.
The U.S.A. has been following a contradictory policy in the Af-Pak itself. While D.C. has been throwing development funds in Southern Afghanistan, it has been shoring up the military on the frontlines in Pakistan.
Ultimately, though, Ambassador Maukapadya does not discern a desire by the Taliban to parley. In the late 1990s, the Taliban regime in Kabul led the U.S. on their intentions. (Your essayist has some questions about this, and that is His Excellency is not separating the goals of a Nationalist Taliban and an Internationalist Alâ€™Quaeda.) Would the Taliban be willing to form a coalition government with Karzai or whoever may succeed him (them)? (Whatever, a re-establishment of the regime of the 1990s is totally unacceptable to International Civil Society without the checks and balances of the partnership of all Afghani peoples and tribes!) The Ambassador is â€œâ€¦not optimistic.â€
There is preparation for a major NATO assault upon the Taliban stronghold around the southern city of Kandahar, the center of Talibani power. Maukapadya does not feel the battle will turn the War around.
Concurrently, Europe and North America and their regional associates are employing dual strategies against the Taliban who are replying in kind. This War is far from coming to a mutually acceptable denouement.